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The USA Patriot Act: The Devil is in the Details
By Elizabeth Barker Brandt and Jack Van Valkenhurgh

lit tie August 2003 issue of Ih. Adthwil, A
Mktant U.S.
Attoiney 'ferry Ierden tuged tie states lawycis to -look at tile
Act."' After all.as most lawyers know, "the devil is in the details."
David Nevin, Scort McKay and Dean Arnold anilyze tile
sigoif1itrm1 chal0 briought about by the USA Patriot Act
("USAPA") and oder post 9111 policy changes. In this article, we
take the Assistant U.S. Attorneys admonition to heart and "look"
in derail ar ,Noe(of the .Rccific
ovisio, of UNAIA, a%they relat.
to tie |otei3 nt intelligence Suiveillance Act (HSA)Y and to the
expansion of non-FISA surveillance. Thoe who seek reassurance
from a detailed analysis of the USAPA, however, will find cold
comfort, Sch an analysis only scrvey to ucler.core concerns that
the Act authorizes serious violations ofIcivil liberties.
1. Roving Wiretap Orders
Section 206 of the USAPA significantly expands the scope of
"roving 'virtlap orders." In 1986, Congress amended the
wirctapping prtvision. of'l itl. III of tile feclend criminal code to
permit roving wile~ups.' A "roving whetap" is one in which the
specific location of the wiretap is not set forth in the order
granting authority to wiretail. Under the 1986 provi.sitmsN, ill
order to get such a wiretap undcr'ritle IlL the govet nieat had to
demonstrate probable cause and that the target was purposefully
changing phones to thwart government surveillanc-c." In addition,
befre wiretapping could hein, the gtveanment needed to
deomnstrate that the taiget was actually using the phone line or
was "ieasonably proximate" to the line that was to be rapped.' In
1998, the "intcntionally thwarting" standard was relaxed so that
the governmenl had to ,,how only that the target's conduct in
changing phones was thwatting the wiretap.'- [lowever, the
requirements of probable cause and "rTe~sonahly proximity to rile
line were nor changed. l'he. lrovishs ensured that the
goveinntit could not use a Loving wiretap older as a fishing
expedition, and they limited the possibility that the tap would
invade the privacy of individuals who were not v:rgetm.
Section 206 of USAPA applies a louseucd vet sion tf de 'ltile
lit roving wiretap luthoaity to IISA. "1lie inclusion of' the roving
witctap piovision in lISA permits crimina investigators to oblin
a PISA order without denins-raring the proiabhl (.atusc ai
required for a Title Ill wiietap. Tle new provision does not
require the govetumentt to demonstrate that the target's conduct
by changing phones is thwarting the rap. Moreover, the [ISA
provision eliminates the retliiirctent oif Tidlc Ill that the
government demotstraw that thy target of the tap has actually
used lie phIone to be taplx'd or been in reasonaile proximity to it.
By loosening the requirements for a Title ILI roving tap and
allowing the Fanrign Inreligence Surveillate Court C(FISC") to
issnc such orleis withotut. making a finding of probable cause,
judicial ovrctight of such orders is diminished. Moreover, since
the government docs not hawv to denItonstrate that the target is
thlwarinjg a tiadhiinal wihetap, it is possiliev to use the roving
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wiretap as a fishing exiteditioti, l'itally, the FISA toying taps have
a much greater probability of invading dite privacy invasions of
Completely unrelated individulls.
U.S. Senator Larry Craig, leading a bi-paitisan gioup that

includes Senator Dick Durbin (D It.) and U.S. Senator Michael
Crapo, has rmccntly introduced legislation it the Senate that
would curtail roving wirctaps to sitntarions where at Icast the
identity ofthe taiget ofilie wiretap is kouwn. ittitled the "SA;E
Act,"" the proposed legislation also would only pet mit the wiretap
to go forward whten the presence of the target at the rapped
ficilirv is known by tlhe
gov ernmlent prior to cutltilg the tap.'
U.S. kpaesentatives ltitch Otter and Mike Simpson expect to
introduce similar legislation in the House of Representatives.1"
2. Sneak and Peek Warrants
Section 213 of the USAPA amends Federal Rule (i'
Criminal
Procedure 41 to permit delayed notlcatlion of a scach. Rule 41
iHviou.ylqtaluirCd that ifa suArCh wMs CotductEd! ill tle absence of
the piopeity owner, the goernment had to leave a copy of the
warrant and notilce the issuing court of its actions. The Ninth
Circuit has hichl that n1tic i,,s
t.onstitulionally tequir.d, but it Iats
not held that contempotanous notice is always constitutionally
required." Some court, have recogni .d exceptons to the
contemporaneous notie teoluirvinent in littited contexts where
nttlifiLatiun would endanger the life or physical saky of an
iha.ividttah tl'ult in flight frorn prosecution, destruction of
evidence or intimidation ofwitnesses; or nhenvise seriously impair
the invQstigatinn or delay trial," 'he wietap canes and witetaip
statutes ate sui genteis because delayed notice is unavoidable in
such cases. However, with respect to physical searches, the tc'
tvs
have allosd drlayed iorice only in very limited contcxts-%Neie
thete is seriouts da ger to life or evidence, and onl)' with respect to
seious crimes, and only on a czase-hy-c.tse basis.
Sfction 213 threatens to reguahrize stiak and peck searches. It
permits delayed nolificaliton ill
ally case ill
which the government
dentontstrates one of the above factors "may occur, regardless of
whether the investigation involves terrorism or tie gathcriing of
foreign intelligence. SUt delaycd notificatin is permitted even
where the government scizes electronic information so long as the
couti issuing the warrant deteritines that delayed notificarion is
"reasonably necessar)y" Section 213 doL' not require that a ctAr
lie notified of the delayed notification and duoes not place any
tutside limit ott when notification must take place.
The Proposed SAFE Act would permit delayed notifiiiati,
hit only where the government demonstrates that notice of the
search 'will" restlt, ineudangering the life or physical safety of an
indidual, flight from prosecution. destruction of" evidence or
intimidationi of witnesseq or otherwise seriously impair ithe
investigation or dtday trial. M iecover, the SAlE Act would
require that notice be provided within seven days o' the search,
hut also provides for ecensions of the ddayl"

3. Trap and Trace Devices and Pen Registers
Section 214 of USAI'A extends the ISA Stantdarl.-i
fr toap
and rtrace dceviccs and pen registers (Cpen/trap devices"' to
investigations alaitist targct%who are nor even agents ofa foreign
power. VISA formerly limited pennllap devices [0 tosc insrntled
on facilities used by foreign agents or individuals vngagud itn
international terrorist or clanlestine intelligence activities," Now,
in older to obtain an order fir a FISA pen/trap device, law
enforcement officials no longer have to show that de filidlity is
being itol i:y
a foreign agent, instead they need onl) show that
the device is likely to reveal informariOn relvanr to a foreign
intelligenec investigation."In addition to eliminating the requiement tiat IFISA pen/trap
device orders he directed at Ireign agents, Section 214 also
extends such orders be nod telephonic communications to
electronic communications. In other words, where a FISA
lIenltrap device order would previously have been available only
for a racility used by a foreign agent and only for telephonic
Coinlunictlions, itcan now he obtaincd ag3ainst ay taigel or

fiilit" and can include c-mail xs well as telcphime infirmadon.
USAPA not only expands the scope of pen/trap orders trdei
FISA, it also exp.uids ,xisting non-FISA law regarding the use of
such devices in criminal investigations. SeLtion 216 erinirs:
roving law eniorcemcnrt pen/trap device ordets and ekpands the
scope ofcxisting law ro include electronic and cellular teliphone
communications. IPtior to UNAPA, federal law allowed law
enforcenment officials to obtain oiders It)
install penltrap dvvivc
on telcphone lines only upon certification that the infoiniation to
be obtained was relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.
'l'hese orders had to be obtahned in the juriadktioni in which the
rclcphone was located.'" Mrmxver, the statutoiy autlority for
such oldern was limited to telephonc "lines.I l
Under tilnew provisions of USAPA, the order for a trap and
trace device or a pen register does nut need to Ietatt:tined in the
jurisdiction in which the phone is located and tle oiden can apply

not only to twlephonic communication but also to cellular
telcphones identified by thkIr dCtrotuiM
sral
numlcr, internet
user accounts or e-mail addiesses, and IP (interact protocols) and
similar computer addressing information. Moreover, the pen
icgiitei ao trp ill trait
order ea.m he sned to ohain routing,
addressing and signaling information such as a list of U116'
accessed by a computer tser. Finally the USAPA revisions make
clear that the Necdon is nor limited to "devices" that must be

"attachted' but could include the use of a computer sofiware

routine to collect the information.,'
Under section 214. investigators cOuld obtain a penttLap
device order either from the I;ISC or from a district court from
the location of the s-arch, 'bget the order, the government only
must certiFjr that what they seek is either rtCvatAI to u,foneigit
intelligence investigation or to a criminal investigation. lie order
cotld lie served on an Internet service provider ("ISP") in Idaho
and could require the ISP to run a toinplter so tware rotinei
track any web page visited by one of the ISP's customers.
At the federal level, the constitutionality of watianless
p;ltrap devices was Conditioned Uponi the snse that the
communicative and informational value of plione numnbers was
minima.l. In Smith *;Mq ndy,/.die U.S. Supreme Court hld
tlat obtaining telephone numbers using a pen register was not a
search requiring law enfurcenent to denitnutrate prblable ctae

based (oit that re.snuiing. 'llc Supreme Court conclusion
legaiding peti/tlap devi .es %:tint wilhlut contrmveriy. ilie
Supreme Courts of a nmfnber of states, iticluding Idaho, reached
dilfering conclusions and required state officials to obtain
wariants based tilt piollt cauw for tie infRtallation ufpen/trap
devices." Tl'he comntiicative value of Internet addressing
information is significantly greatet than telephone numnbes.
URLs atre not siuiply a list of mtmhers reaching a phone that may
be answered by a nmber ofdiflaiet ptople. Rather UlIU s ofien
contain the name of the web site sponsor. hlotcover; attaded to
that URL k relatively stable content, Any person who goes to
wwwatt.olg views tile
Same informatiot that any other lerson
who goes to that site sees.
4. Business Records
Section 215 of LSAPA expands previous FISA prtvisions
regarding business records and makes them applicable even when
the rargrt is not in agent of a loreign lower, PISA previously
piovided that, wher tie tabt
o of the investigaton vas lile
agent
of a foreign power, senior FBI officials could apply fur a court
order in connection with a treign intelligence investigation for
access to the records of common carriers, itblic acconimodations
providers, physical stolage opetatots. and vehicle rental agcnmics.'
The USAPA substantially rewrites these provisions, Now assistant
auents ill
charge oFFl31 field ohlires can apply for such orders. The
order can extend to ,aytangible objet. held by anyn t (including
documents. computer discs. etc.). Items sought need not relate to
an idenileid forcign aretr as previottsly required by F[SA.Rather
law enforcement of,,cials intit only show that tie items are,
sought in connection with an investigatiton relating to
international terroristm or cl;ndestine intelligence activities. '+
Pitibtsunt itthis protvision ofUSAPA,federal law enforccment
officials can collect empluent records, internet records, credit
card information and library botmowing infotnatrioL , all
without
even suggesting that the owner of the records was involved with
or s opeu;rd of any criminal arriviry or involvement in fhrcig
intelligence. In fact, criminal investigatots could seek a I4SA
business records ord-r based solely on the octrtification to the
FISC that the information sought is needed as parr of an
investigation of clandestine intelligeice activitit. Uiig Lis
order, they could obtain library borrowing records, employment
and student recrds, credit card infhrmation .snd melication
infottuationt for any individu;al. whether that pcrmon i- tIhe target
of the investigation or a foreign agent.
The propowd ,SAFE Act would limit the reach of FISA
basimos% recordi orders hy requiring that the government
demonsttate and the judge find that the records pertain to a
foreign power or agent of a foreign potr."
5. Nationwide Search Warrants
Rule 4 1 of the Federal Rules of Ci iminal Procedure Cot netly
reqtuired a search warranr to be issued by a court in the
jurisdiction it vhich ilt.:
Ittperty to he se.arched is located.
Section 219 of the USAPA allows a judge in a case involving
donwcstic or international terrotism to issue a search warrant that
"in be exccttcd ihher inside or outside the district where the
cout is located. Section 220 amiends federal law to penmh ,sul
warrants to be executred nationwide."
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Idaho Representative Butch O'er has spoken otit against the
use of such nationwMe search warr.ints, In oine plre-irnraion lit:
ndiscd the :aitcler ifa judge in Manhatutn passi; un a s.ch
warrant authoi izing the seach of propcrty in Idaho. The warrant

was based on the belief'F New York law entkrcenwnt agenrs That
an fdahn residenr - i porltil terrorist I)callse he wa
iphotoirautt
d driving a pickup Iuuck past the United State%
Courthouse in MoscOW. Idaho with nitrogen krtilirer, diesel ftel
and scvcr;,l large harrcl in the irurk hdl.: 1 What
Is I.,girinte
agruitural ;iLivity in Iddho could take on significant weight in
a teitorism invcistigation in New York.

Conclusion
We do not deny that ttu.rrorism his talcen waun, irnnocent lives,
both ithin and widout the United Stites. Nor do i.e nljtcr rs
any "updiritig" -f federil law in addrims ncw tclhnologies and
hew ihrcatS Lu p)ublic safety.
Wc do, howcver, insist that the changes to the surveillance
authority of Federad law enforcement nflicin; eniholdicd in tile
L;SAPA an- fit-reaching and iigtnitiant. The iuniulative impact
of the provisions is startling. Viewed together, the provisions
attempt an "end-run" iritmnd the Fourth Anendinent's probabh'
catise requirclm.. Although federal jtidial tiveisight
iO
elininated, it i6seriumly undermined by piovisioms that do away
with probable catisc, movite
teuority to otder tarches to ili
FISC or to courts outside the area o he %airdivtl,and peniut
searches of undesignated loc, tion,, Rather than evaluating I
watant request baseo on a factual record establishing probable
cause, the federal judge is reduccd tn the miiicrinl role tif
.,nusuring thnhr neress'ir, cerificatimis ale included in a search
re utUest, 11' opelttlg the plucotlules of thc FISC to criinial
Jicstigators and pboviting Ior nationwide orders, I SAPA
permits even this ministerial finction in take phicCe eithher i1
secrecy or in a location Cir frm the Ltolntxt or the swatch.
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